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Abstract
This Article compares the pattern of fundamental change, legal and reg-
ulatory response, and judicial adaptation underlying the electricity sector’s 
twentieth century beginnings to its current and ongoing rapid transition.  This 
comparison is then used as a basis to examine and contextualize the collabo-
rative federalism jurisdictional framework that the Supreme Court employs 
when adjudicating modern-day jurisdictional disputes in the sector.
The early 1900s saw a period of rapid industry expansion, with the elec-
tricity sector progressing from small intrastate utilities to a sprawling interstate 
grid.  The expanding grid rapidly outgrew the state-led regulatory framework 
that had organically developed.  In turn, Congress responded by passing the 
Federal Power Act to fill what is now known as the Attleboro gap.  Courts in 
turn needed to resolve consequent jurisdictional tensions that arose under the 
new federal and state balance of authority.  The courts employed a bright-line 
jurisdictional framework that divided authority on the basis of location, adju-
dicating disputes by determining where the contested action took place.  This 
line-drawing split federal authority on one side of the juridical line—such as 
wholesale sales and interstate activities—and state authority on the other, such 
as retail sales and intrastate activities.
Just as the interstate expansion of the grid disrupted industry and regu-
latory structure in the 1900s, modern rapid change is once again creating new 
benefits and interests through foundational sector disruption.  This disruption 
has similarly placed pressure upon the electricity sector and its regulation.  This 
Article analyzes three foundational changes to the electricity sector that are 
spurring energy transition and grid modernization: opening the industry to 
competitive market forces; technological advances making a multidirectional 
grid possible; and evolving state policy preferences and priorities that seek to 
combat climate change.
The foundational change underway in the electricity sector has spurred 
a legal and regulatory response in order to create new connections between 
longstanding statutory mandate and sector change.  Congress, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and states have responded with laws 
and regulations that acknowledge a sector that now resists simple, bright-line 
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jurisdictional division.  These responses have invited increasingly frequent 
court review.  In adjudicating disputes in the electricity sector, the courts 
have turned to and fully embraced a functionalist, ‘collaborative federalism’ 
jurisdictional framework.  This jurisdictional framework considers an issue’s 
intent, target, and effect rather than an issue’s location.  It best enables courts 
to adjudicate disputes in the context of changes occurring within the modern 
electricity sector.
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Introduction
The United States electricity sector is undergoing fundamental change. 
Increasing competition, technological innovation, and environmental policy 
imperatives are reshaping the electricity sector.  This change holds enormous 
promise; sector modernization drives more affordable and reliable electricity. 
Rapid change has also spurred policy makers and regulators to reexamine the 
elemental legal structures underpinning the sector.  This reaction is significant; 
incumbent actors have challenged regulatory and legal response in court at 
every turn.1
Such litigation is predictable given the industry’s monopolistic roots, 
historically tight regulation, and the transition’s scale and scope.  Indeed, the 
pattern of change, reaction, and resolution is not unique; a similar history led 
to the passage of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in 1935.  The circumstances 
surrounding the FPA’s passage—changing technology, a legal and regulatory 
response, and symptomatic jurisdictional tension—is instructive.  The way 
industry actors, governmental regulators, and courts acted during that period 
of rapid transition provides a template upon which current actions can be 
understood and framed.  This Article explores that prior context and com-
pares it to the sector’s current transition.  It then examines how current trends 
are spurring a legal and regulatory response, which in turn prompts courts to 
adjust the jurisdictional frameworks to better adjudicate disputes.  This Article 
proceeds in four Parts.
Part I introduces the past: traditional electricity sector regulation from 
inception to around the 1970s.  This Part pays particular attention to the 
ways in which advancing technology strained the prior regulatory regime, the 
development of new law to harmonize the disjointed sector, and the judicial 
interpretation of that new law based on the grid’s physical characteristics.
Part II describes present changes underway in the sector: restructuring, 
technological innovation, and evolving state environmental policy priorities 
and preferences.  This Part explores how these changes create new pressures 
upon longstanding regulatory and legal structures created to oversee the sector 
as described in Part I.
Part III discusses the legal and regulatory response to the foundational 
change described in Part II.  Just as Congress responded to technological 
changes with the FPA in the 1930s, legislators and regulators have crafted 
1. E.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (challenging FERC’s 
authority over demand response resource participation); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 
(2002) (challenging FERC’s authority to issue Order No. 888, requiring public utilities to 
promote competition by providing nondiscriminatory access to electric transmission); S.C. 
Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (challenging FERC’s authority to 
issue Order No. 1000 regarding allocation of costs of new transmission facilities); Me. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (challenging FERC’s approval of ISO-
NE’s Forward Capacity Market); Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC 
¶ 61,236 (2018) (challenging PJM capacity repricing model and MOPR-Ex).
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responsive policies and actions to realign FERC’s foundational mandate in 
light of sector change.
Part IV explains how the legal and regulatory response to sector transi-
tion has spurred jurisdictional tension between federal and state actors.  Here, 
this Article describes how courts have adopted a collaborative federalism 
jurisdictional framework in the face of the sector transition, and legal and reg-
ulatory response as described in Parts II and III.
This Article reaches several conclusions.  First, it finds that current sector 
trends closely resemble the transition that unfolded at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  That is, the fundamental sector change that led to the Attle-
boro gap, the FPA, and the adoption of a ‘bright-line’ jurisdictional framework 
mirrors the impact of current foundational change.  Modern changes have led 
to a legal and regulatory response and the adoption of the ‘collaborative fed-
eralism’ jurisdictional framework.  Second, this Article asserts that this pattern 
is instructive in understanding today’s sector evolution.  Three fundamental 
changes—restructuring, technological innovation, and evolving state policy 
preferences—have driven legal and regulatory response.  In turn, a jurisdic-
tional framework has taken shape that equips judges with the tools needed 
to resolve disputes with legal and regulatory responses to foundational sector 
change.  The adoption of a ‘collaborative federalism’ jurisdictional framework 
enables courts to resolve disputes regarding the FPA’s division of authority 
through a lens that best fits the changes occurring in the sector today.2
I. Traditional Energy Sector Regulation
A. Foundational Change: Growth of the Grid and the Attleboro Gap
Edison helped spark a new industry with the invention of the first practi-
cal light bulb in 1879.3  The first centralized generation was installed three years 
later, on Pearl Street in New York City.4  Scores of electric companies would 
sprout up over the next decade.5  Regulatory oversight followed soon after, 
2. This Article employs the term ‘collaborative federalism’ to refer to the current 
jurisdictional framework employed by the court in interpreting FPA jurisdictional consid-
erations.  See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1300 (2016) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (describing the FPA as a “collaborative federalism statute[]”).  Other articles 
have designated this framework as ‘concurrent jurisdiction.’  E.g., Daniel Lyons, Protecting 
States in the New World of Energy Federalism, 67 Emory L.J. 921 (2018); Joel B. Eisen, Dual 
Electricity Federalism is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 Geo. Wash. J. Energy 
& Envtl. L. 3 (2017); Jim Rossi, The brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 
399 (2016).  This Article considers the contours of the theories outlined in these articles to be 
broadly similar, regardless of the specific term used.
3. Richard F. Hirsh, Emergence of Electrical Utilities in America, Nat’l Mus. of Am. 
Hist., http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/past/h1main.htm [https://perma.cc/VC4P-
MCZS] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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with state legislation first enacted in 1907.6  By 1914, a total of forty-three more 
states had followed suit.7
State regulation in this early era made practical sense; the sector took the 
form and function of natural monopolies best suited for careful oversight to 
prevent anticapitalist ills associated with an absence of competition.8  Similarly, 
the timing of state regulation made sense; in a span of less than thirty years, the 
United States had moved from single light bulb to entire electric grids, owned 
and operated by electric utility companies.  Regulatory oversight sprang up 
with commensurate speed.  States, rather than the federal government, first 
regulated the sector—an organic result that mirrored an industry of generally 
small, isolated, and individual electricity grids.9  Yet this was changing rapidly, 
with systems growing increasingly larger in scale.
The growth of the electricity grid, enabled by technological change and a 
heavily regulated monopolistic industry created important benefits.  An inter-
connected grid provided a larger balancing area, which supported reliability.10 
It also allowed for pooling of resources and improved economies of scale, and 
reduced the cost to the end consumer.11  Close regulatory oversight and reg-
ulated rate of return based upon volume incented electric utilities to build, in 
turn expanding the grid to new population centers.12  For these reasons, the 
buildout of the electricity grid was an important and positive development. 
6. Wisconsin and New York can both claim credit.  Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.  but see Gretchen Bakke, The Grid: The Fraying Wires Between Americans 
and Our Energy Future xxv–xxx (2016) (discussing the chaotic and haphazard evolution 
of the United States’ electric grid).
9. Even before states, “[l]ocal authorities granted private companies monopoly fran-
chises in exchange for regulating their rates and services.”  Devin Hartman, Federal Power 
Act and Organized Electricity Markets, R Street: Elec. 101 Series, at 1 (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/electricity1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG8J-
TQZD].
10. J. Duncan Glover et al., Power System: Analysis & Design 17 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“An interconnected utility can draw upon another’s rotating generator reserves during a 
time of need (such as a sudden generator outage or load increase), thereby maintaining 
continuity of service, increasing reliability, and reducing the total number of generators that 
need to be kept running under no-load conditions.  Also, interconnected utilities can sched-
ule power transfers during normal periods to take advantage of energy-cost differences in 
respective areas, load diversity, time zone differences, and seasonal conditions.  For example, 
utilities whose generation is primarily hydro can supply low-cost power during high-water 
periods in spring/summer, and can receive power from the interconnection during low-water 
periods in fall/winter.  Interconnections also allow shared ownership of larger, more efficient 
generating units.”).
11. FERC, Energy Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics 36 (2015) [herein-
after FERC Energy Primer], https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments/guide/energy-primer.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B7D5-N7ZB].
12. See generally Stephen Tully, The Human Right to Access Electricity, 19 Elec. J. 30 
(2006) (explaining the necessity of a human right to access and the existing human rights 
framework for such a right).
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However, it strained a legal and regulatory structure not designed for inter-
state oversight.
An early interstate transmission contract ultimately pushed the sector’s 
regulatory structure to its limit.  In 1917, Narragansett Electric Lighting Com-
pany, a Rhode Island company, agreed to sell power at a specified rate for 
twenty years to Attleboro Steam & Electric Company, a Massachusetts com-
pany.  Attleboro planned to use that power to supply customers in and around 
the City of Attleboro.13  The electricity was to be delivered “by the Narra-
gansett Company at the state line between Rhode Island and Massachusetts 
and carried over connecting transmission lines to the station of the Attleboro 
Company in Massachusetts, where it was to be metered.”14  The Narragansett 
Company filed the contract with the Rhode Island Public Utility Commission 
(PUC), which approved the matter.15
All proceeded smoothly for several years.  However, a conflict emerged 
in 1924, when the Narragansett Company sought to increase the rate for Attle-
boro Steam & Electric.  It filed a new contract with the Rhode Island PUC 
“purporting to cancel the original schedule and establish an increased rate for 
electric current supplied, in specified minimum quantities, to electric lighting 
companies for their own use or sale to their customers and delivered either 
in Rhode Island or at the [s]tate line.”16  The new contract only applied to the 
Attleboro Company, which led the Rhode Island PUC to institute an investi-
gation involving both companies.17  Based upon its review, the PUC found the 
original contract rate was unreasonable and approved the Narragansett Com-
pany’s new contract.18  The Attleboro Company quickly appealed the decision, 
finding relief before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which held that “the 
order of the Commission imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce and 
was invalid because of conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution.”19
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the state supreme court 
that “the sale of electric current by the Narragansett Company to the Attle-
boro Company is a transaction in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the 
fact that the current is delivered at the [s]tate line.”20  Therefore, the Court rea-
soned, “[t]he rate is . . . not subject to regulation by either of the two states in 
the guise of protection to their respective local interests.”21  But, the Court also 
acknowledged the lack of any federal regulator with authority over the rate: 
“[I]f such regulation is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the 
13. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84 (1927).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 85.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 85–86.
19. Id. at 86.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 90.
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power vested in Congress.”22  The decision’s immediate impact was to leave 
state PUCs powerless in matters involving interstate electricity transactions. 
Yet even more farreaching, the decision effectively made regulation of inter-
state electricity transactions impossible, as no federal regulatory entity existed 
to provide the needed oversight.  The result was the so-called Attleboro gap—a 
space in which state entities were barred from exercising regulatory authority 
and federal entities were conspicuously absent.
B. The Legal Response: Passage of the Federal Power Act
The Attleboro gap was a symptom of natural industry evolution and 
growth.  Within a few decades a sector was created out of whole cloth: from 
unconnected light bulb to generating station; from generating station to small 
utility; from small utility to consolidated monopoly.   Yet, despite such rapid 
technological advances across the industry, the regulatory structure stood still. 
Without federal law or a federal regulator, congressional action was the only 
remedy available to harmonize a now disjointed sector.23  In 1935, Congress 
took this step by enacting the FPA.24  This legislative action was an explicit 
response to the Attleboro gap,25 closing the regulatory no-man’s land by vest-
ing a federal authority (originally the Federal Power Commission (FPC),26 now 
FERC) with power over “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce” and “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce.”27
The FPA restored harmony in the electricity sector by extending state-
level public interest motivations and protections to interstate transactions.28 
The law’s passage and the timing of that passage were responsive to rapid 
sector growth, with the FPA establishing a regulatory structure reflective of and 
responsive to the sector’s physical characteristics.29  Courts likewise responded, 
adopting a jurisdictional framework suited to adjudicating disputes following 
the FPA’s passage.
C. Traditional Judicial Interpretation of the FPA’s Jurisdictional Framework
Judicial review, like law and regulation, necessarily evolved in response 
to the sector’s growth and change.  The passage of the FPA closed the Attle-
boro gap by establishing a federal regulator, but also ensured states retained 
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74–333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
25. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 409 n.47.
26. The FPC was originally created in 1920 but was solely responsible for hydroelectric 
projects prior to the FPA.  Hartman, supra note 9, at 1.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
28. Id. § 824(a) (declaring that the sale and distribution of energy is “affected with 
a public interest,” and therefore that regulation of wholesale and interstate transactions is 
“necessary in the public interest”).
29. Rossi, supra note 2, at 409–10.
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regulatory authority over intrastate aspects of the electricity grid.30  In doing 
so, the FPA ensured a “steady flow” of jurisdictional cases.31  In the years fol-
lowing the law’s passage, the Court reviewed such cases with a ‘bright-line’ 
jurisdictional framework.  As the Court stated in Federal Power Commission 
v. Southern California Edison, “Congress meant to draw a bright line easily 
ascertained between state and federal jurisdiction.”32
Bright-line jurisdiction was well-suited to the general contours of the 
mid-twentieth century electric grid.  This framework required the dividing of 
activity into inter- and intrastate jurisdictional spheres, with the federal gov-
ernment responsible for the former and state government responsible for the 
latter.33  The judicial application of this framework split actions and assets 
into either the federal or state sphere of authority, including divisions along 
“transaction and customer type (wholesale v. retail), facility type (generation 
v. transmission v. distribution), geography (interstate commerce v. intrastate 
commerce), and regulatory action (e.g., rate regulation v. facility permitting).”34 
Judges used bright-line jurisdiction because of the legal and regulatory struc-
tures, physical grid characteristics, and policy considerations that existed during 
this time period.35
The legal and regulatory structures that developed in the aftermath of the 
FPA’s passage assumed a monopolistic electric sector.36  Vertically integrated 
utilities owned all assets from generation to customer meters.37  Merchant gen-
erators, Independent System Operators, and market-based rates would not exist 
for another sixty years.38  Instead, utility companies received a regulated rate of 
30. “The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or 
sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the genera-
tion of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission 
of electric energy in intrastate commerce.”  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
31. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016).
32. 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964).
33. Eisen, supra note 2, at 5 (“This bright line was typical of the early twentieth cen-
tury’s dual federalism, which posited that federal and state regulatory authority could be 
separated neatly into exclusive spheres.”).
34. Jeffery S. Dennis et al., Federal/State Jurisdictional Split: Implications 
for Emerging Electricity Technologies 4 (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/2017/01/f34/Federal%20State%20Jurisdictional%20Split-Implications%20for%20
Emerging%20Electricity%20Technologies.pdf.
35. Eisen, supra note 2, at 4–5 (describing bright-line jurisdiction as a product of its 
time, while highlighting the significant changes to the physical and regulatory structures of 
the grid since the 1930s that render bright-line jurisdiction increasingly untenable).
36. Hirsh, supra note 3; Francisco Flores-Espino et al., Competitive Electricity 
Market Regulation in the United States: A Primer 9 (2016) (noting that approximately 
two-thirds of electricity consumers are now served by ISOs and RTOs rather than vertically 
integrated utilities).
37. Flores-Espino et al., supra note 36, at 8.
38. See generally Our History, ISO New England, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/
what-we-do/history [https://perma.cc/8XUC-YS54] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019) (providing a 
timeline of major events in energy sector regulation and ISO New England’s history).
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return.  Regulation developed in response to the FPA’s statutory mandates at 
this time focused upon the reasonableness of a utility’s proposed specific rate 
of return, and relied upon FERC’s regulatory review of those filed rates rather 
than competitive forces to prescribe a just and reasonable rate.39  Monopolies, 
by definition, prevent multiple asset owners, which prevents competition.  With-
out such competition, FERC’s review was confined; the Commission could not 
give economic preference to favored assets when competition between assets 
did not exist.40  As such, the line between retail and wholesale rate regulation 
and between state and federal interests was fairly delineated and could be adju-
dicated under a bright-line jurisdictional framework.41
The physical infrastructure of the grid likewise lent itself well to a bright-
line jurisdictional framework, particularly given the clear physical separation 
between transmission and distribution.  During this time the grid was structured 
as a one-way machine.  Large power plants generated electricity, which was 
then dispatched across transmission lines.  The electricity was ramped down at 
substations, and was finally provided to end-users through distribution lines.42 
Although the electricity grid was increasing in size and scale, the technology it 
relied upon was wholly unidirectional.43  Customers were treated as purchas-
ers of electricity (that is, the “demand” matched against generation “supply”) 
and did not have colocated supply.44  Conversely, supplyside generation assets 
were treated as the only assets available.45  The resource mix consisted of fairly 
uniform, dispatchable assets, with a set of well-understood—although not 
explicitly recognized—capabilities, physics, services, and features.46  Suppli-
ers treated demand as predictable.  Grid planners considered year-over-year 
39. Id.  Note that this should not be read to suggest that FERC’s regulatory role is 
diminished now that it more heavily relies upon competition to prescribe just and reasonable 
rates.  Rather, FERC’s regulatory role has changed and evolved in response to competitive 
forces, as described in more detail below.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2012).
41. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 12, 16–18 (2002) (recognizing that “the landscape of 
the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA,” but agreeing with FERC’s 
conclusion that when a retail transaction is separated into two products sold separately (i.e., 
unbundled) the states “clearly retain[] jurisdiction over the sale of power” but the “transmis-
sion transaction falls within the Federal sphere of regulation”).
42. Dennis et al., supra note 34, at 7 (citing Quadrennial Energy Review: Energy 
Transmission, Storage, and Distribution Infrastructure 3–3 (2015), http://energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2015/07/f24/QER%20Full%20Report_TS%26D%20April%202015_0.pdf).
43. Id.
44. One needs to look no further than a solar array colocated on a homeowner’s roof-
top to witness how dramatically this previous assumption has changed.
45. Id. at 8 (“[A]lmost no generation resources were owned by non-utilities.”).
46. See Energy Sources Have Changed Throughout the History of the United States, 
U.S. Energy Information Administration: Today in Energy (July 3, 2013), https://www.eia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11951 [https://perma.cc/Q4P6-D8XG] (“The three major 
fossil fuels—petroleum, natural gas, and coal . . . have dominated the U.S. fuel mix for well 
over 100 years.”).
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growth in demand to be constant, and in need of a corresponding supply.  Such 
clear segmentation of the physical grid enabled courts to make distinct juris-
dictional divisions between transmission and distribution, and thus between 
federal and state regulators.47
Lastly, bright-line jurisdiction provided judges with a tool to consider an 
array of energy policy considerations at both the state and federal level.  States 
took actions that were within their FPA-guaranteed jurisdiction, from directing 
in-state generation portfolios to providing primarily fossil-fuel interests large 
subsidies to retail ratemaking.48  Courts, in turn, generally upheld the broad 
authority and discretion of states to act in furtherance of their citizens’ welfare 
and wellbeing.49
The pattern that emerges is instructive.  Changes to the characteristics 
of the electricity grid and energy sector acted as an initiating force, creating 
pressure upon the legal and regulatory structures designed for an increasingly 
outdated set of assumptions and expectations.  Lawmakers responded by pass-
ing the FPA to close the Attleboro gap, and regulation, such as through FERC 
and state PUC activity.  The courts responded in turn, employing a bright-line 
jurisdictional framework to resolve disputes stemming from the jurisdictional 
interplay the newly crafted law and regulation created.  As described in greater 
detail below, a similar pattern has emerged today; it begins with foundational 
changes in the electricity sector and ends with a new jurisdictional framework 
in light of those changes.
II. Foundational Change Underway in the Electricity Sector
The electricity sector is often characterized as resistant to change and 
progress.50  This stagnation is juxtaposed against a recently-brewing “storm of 
47. Dennis et al., supra note 34, at 8.
48. See generally Nancy Pfund & Ben Healey, DBL Investors, What Would 
Jefferson Do?  The Historical Role of Federal Subsidies in Shaping America’s Energy 
Future (2011), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/20094/pfund_what.
pdf.
49. States, through their “police powers,” generally maintain control over, and can reg-
ulate in relation to, matters that are related to the promotion and maintenance of the health, 
safety and general welfare of the public.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 
(1991) (“The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for 
the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”).
50. This trope is often represented as “a tired truism that Edison would have little 
trouble recognizing today’s power grid.”  Peter Kelly-Detwiler, The Economist: Innovation 
Almost Dead.  Perhaps Not So in Electricity, Forbes (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/peterdetwiler/2013/01/23/the-economist-innovation-almost-dead-perhaps-not-so-
in- energy/#51ce9e725427 [https://perma.cc/SD53-DRXD].  Or other times as a statement 
detailing how “the system has essentially remained the same for the past 100 years.”  Grid 
Edge 20: The Top Companies Disrupting the US Electric Market, GTM (Apr. 23, 2015), https://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Grid-Edge-20-The-Top-Companies-Disrupting-
The-U.S.-Electric-Market [https://perma.cc/9HUG-4QLG].  but see Eisen, supra note 2, at 4 
(“The FPA’s drafters would have considerable difficulty recognizing today’s grid.”).
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new innovation and technology deployment which may well radically change 
the power grid forever.”51  On the surface, recent innovation in the sector 
appears to resemble more of an abrupt and drastic revolution, rather than an 
evolution.  However, the sector has been steadily changing for years, moving 
from a “traditional” to a “modern” era.  This evolution has not been uniform. 
The electricity grid is now a patchwork of technologies, resources, and regu-
latory regimes that belie unifying description,52 and yet trends have emerged. 
Beginning in the 1990s, structural changes in the electricity system have been 
taking root in large swaths of the United States and in turn necessitated a legal 
and regulatory response.53  Cumulatively, these changes created new pressures 
upon the sector that are reminiscent of those witnessed during the sector’s evo-
lution in the years leading up to Attleboro and the FPA.
This Part explores the recent and ongoing fundamental changes under-
way in the United States’ electricity sector, namely: (1) restructuring, and the 
advent of Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System 
Operators; (2) technological innovation; and (3) evolving state policy prefer-
ences and priorities.
A. Restructuring, and the Advent of the Regional Transmission Organization 
and Independent System Operator
In the aftermath of FPA passage, regulatory oversight assumed the 
regulated party was a single entity responsible for production, transmission, 
distribution, and the direct sale of electricity.54  That is, the drafters of the 
legal and regulatory system premised the system upon the assumption that a 
single entity owned and operated the entire enterprise, from power plant to 
end meter.  This assumption began to shift in the 1970s and 1980s, when new 
economic and political rationales drove an “impulse to restructure.”55  Restruc-
turing was premised upon a view that not all facets of the energy sector may 
lend themselves as well to a monopolistic industry as was previously believed.
51. Kelly-Detwiler, supra note 50.
52. See William Boyd & Ann Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy 
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 816 (2016).  Competitive whole-
sale power markets serve one example of the patchwork nature of the grid, with roughly 
two-thirds of demand in the country falling within an ISO footprint and roughly one-third 
remaining in traditionally regulated structures.  See Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/
ESD-16/1, Survey of U.S. Ancillary Services Markets 2 (2016).
53. See Flores-Espino et al., supra note 36, at 9 (describing state led restructuring 
that required utilities to divest their generation assets).
54. See Philip L. Cantelon, The Regulatory Dilemma of the Federal Power Commission, 
1920–1977, 4 Fed. Hist. J. 61, 69 (2012) (highlighting a Federal Power Commission statement 
from 1940 that its job was to “fully protect the public” against the monopoly power of the 
utility industry).
55. David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 Cornell L. 
Rev. 756, 770 (2008).
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Energy service might be a natural monopoly if the production and deliv-
ery of energy were necessarily one bundled product; but they are not.  Rather, 
the production and delivery of energy are two separate products.  Deliv-
ery—transmission and distribution service—is a structure which lends itself 
to monopolistic enterprise.  The construction of multiple delivery networks 
between two points is often inefficient.  The production (and sale) of energy, 
however, is not a natural monopoly.  As such, one can unbundle production 
(and sales) from distribution, in turn allowing buyers in wholesale and retail 
markets to choose their energy supplier even if they must take delivery service 
from a monopoly provider.  Competition in energy production should weed 
out producers that cannot provide a reliable service at competitive prices. 
Accordingly, consumers—broadly defined to include all customer classes—
should benefit from the cost discipline that competition brings.56
Advocates of restructuring thus argued that competition could be intro-
duced to determine wholesale rates.  To do so, restructuring required the 
decoupling of energy production and the delivery of that energy so they could 
be sold as distinct commodities with the former subject to competition and the 
latter remaining a monopoly service.57
FERC, with the support of Congress, encouraged restructuring in the 
1980s and 1990s.58  However, the result was not uniform and “three basic models 
of electricity regulation emerg[ed] across the country: a fully restructured 
model that combines competition at wholesale and retail levels; a traditional 
model that continues to employ the basic cost-of-service approach .  .  .  ; and 
a hybrid model that combines competitive wholesale markets with regulated 
retail service.”59  Twenty states retained the traditional model; sixteen states 
and Washington, D.C. adopted a fully restructured model; and twelve states 
adopted a hybrid model.60  The grid is a patchwork of regulatory, design, and 
technology alternatives, with each variation having its own set of rationales, 
thus, it resists simple grading.61
56. Id. at 771–72.
57. Whether restructuring has accomplished its goal is beyond the scope of this Article 
and a subject of debate.  See, e.g., Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Industry 
After 20 Years of Restructuring (Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper No. 252, 2015), https://
ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP252.pdf.
58. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (1992) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)) (enabling FERC to require transmitting utilities to provide 
electric transmission to generators that are not part of the transmitters monopoly provider); 
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services By Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888]; see also Boyd & Carlson, 
supra note 52, at 831.
59. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 52, at 814.
60. Id. at 836–38.
61. See generally id. (finding that the regulatory diversity throughout the United States 
may ultimately be beneficial).
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In fully restructured and hybrid areas of the United States, the creation 
of a new entity to organize and oversee market structures became necessary. 
Multiple merchant generators, competing to provide supply, replaced a single 
vertically integrated utility.  Consequently, market administrators were needed 
to identify and select the most cost-effective competitors.  FERC encouraged 
the creation of such entities through new regulations, Order Nos. 888 and 2000, 
which ushered in “Regional Transmission Organizations” and “Independent 
System Operators” (RTO and ISO, respectively).62  These interstate, nonprofit, 
and private entities now cover roughly two-thirds of the United States.63  ISOs 
act as the market administrator, running wholesale market auctions that set 
wholesale prices.
RTO market operations encompass multiple services that are needed to 
provide reliable and economically efficient electric service to customers.  Each 
of these services has its own parameters and pricing.  The RTOs use markets to 
determine the provider(s) and prices for many of these services.  These markets 
include the day-ahead energy market (sometimes called a Day 2 market), real-
time energy market (sometimes called a Day 1 or balancing market), capacity 
markets (designed to ensure enough generation is available to reliably meet 
peak power demands), ancillary services markets, financial transmission rights 
(contracts for hedging the cost of limited transmission capability), and virtual 
trading (financial instruments to create price convergence in the day-ahead 
and real-time markets).64
Restructuring provided the impetus and the ability for competition to 
take root in a once wholly monopolistic sector, while ISOs provided the plat-
form for that competition to flourish.  These wholesale, interstate entities 
spurred competition, and “[a]s these markets took shape, a new class of inde-
pendent power producers or merchant generators entered to compete with 
incumbent utilities.”65
The transition from monopoly to competition has been significant not 
only for its impact upon rates, but also for its impact upon FERC’s regulatory 
role.  FERC was previously tasked primarily with considering the cost-based 
rate sought by the filing utility.66  By unlocking competitive forces, FERC’s 
review changed; it focused upon the market-based rate determined by ISO 
auctions instead of the return sought by individual assets.67  FERC’s mar-
ket-based rate review fundamentally changed not only its role as regulator, but 
62. See Order No. 888, supra note 58; Regional Transmission Organizations, Order 
No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999) [hereinafter Order No. 2000].  For the purposes of this 
Article, ISO is used to refer to both ISOs and RTOs.
63. FERC Energy Primer, supra note 11, at 40.
64. Id. at 59.
65. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 52, at 832.
66. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1783, 1806–07 (2016).
67. Id. at 1792–93.
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the industry itself.  FERC’s just and reasonableness standard morphed from 
a charge to consider an asset’s cost to a charge to consider an asset’s com-
petitiveness.  This mandate, effectuated through wholesale markets, created a 
new FERC policy preference.  Because wholesale markets necessarily favor 
least-cost resources, competition introduced a federal “preference” for more 
economic, lower cost assets over less economic, higher cost assets in a way that 
did not previously exist.68
Restructuring and the advent of ISOs has fundamentally changed 
the electricity sector.  Market participants have increased, FERC’s role has 
changed, and state regulators must now interact with a newly created entity 
in ISOs.  As an economic theory has taken hold that emphasizes restructuring 
and encourages competitive markets, regulators have reexamined the FPA’s 
language and traditional structure, particularly in light of the technological 
advances described in the Part below.
B. Technological Advances
The electric sector can be subdivided into four parts: generation, trans-
mission, distribution, and load.69  Generation refers to the production of 
electricity, which takes place at individual power plants.  It then moves through 
transmission lines, which transport high-voltage energy over long distances 
from generators to population centers.  Energy, decreased to a lower voltage, is 
next transported via distribution lines to end-users.  Lastly, end-users consume 
the energy.  Load refers to the total amount of consumption by end-users in 
a given area.70  In contrast, information has traditionally flowed in the oppo-
site direction.  Customer energy–use data is collected by electricity meters and 
meter readers, assembled by utility companies, and used to inform a host of 
decisions, from whether to build new transmission and generation to what the 
correct price to bill each end-user should be.71
The traditional electric sector infrastructure and available technology 
was only capable of allowing energy to flow in one direction, from power plant 
to end-user, and information to flow in the other direction, from end-user to 
utility.  This structure lent itself well to the law and regulation put in place 
around the FPA’s passage.  With the Attleboro gap closed, FERC could reg-
ulate the initial portions of the flow: interstate sales of wholesale generation 
68. Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and Environmental 
Law, 41 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 339, 359 (2017) (describing how FERC market rules “deter-
mine the order in which different types of energy, such as coal, natural gas, and wind power, 
will be dispatched to satisfy demand”).
69. Electricity is Delivered to Consumers Through a Complex Network, U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin.: Electricity Explained (last updated Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/ 
energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity_delivery [https://perma.cc/AM6F-ZKD6].
70. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 52, at 820–22 (describing the electric power system 
components and how energy travels from generator to end user).
71. Electric Meters, Dep’t of Energy, https://energy.gov/energysaver/electric-meters 
[https://perma.cc/AR69-QVUQ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
2020 FROM ATTLEbORO TO EPSA 15
and transmission.  State PUC regulatory oversight applied to intrastate activ-
ity, taking hold once electricity was reduced to a lower voltage and transported 
through distribution lines.72
Sector technology is fundamentally changing.  The sector remains home 
to familiar figures such as power plants, transmission lines, and load.  It is also 
home to wholly new machinery: solar rooftops, smart homes, and electric vehi-
cles.  These resources differ significantly from those depicted in a traditional 
electricity grid, not only because of the resource types but also because of 
the resource locations.  Solar rooftops sit on the end-user’s property, inject-
ing power back into the grid.73  Distributed energy resources can be installed 
by companies other than a monopoly utility.74  Technology-enabled energy 
resources like demand response and energy efficiency provide end-users with 
greater transparency and control over their consumption.75  Energy storage 
allows end-users to control when they need to draw electricity from the grid, 
thereby unlocking the potential for greater consumer responsiveness to the 
market rate and a significantly reduced peak demand.76
This locational shift is a fundamental departure from the traditional 
utility and industry model because energy and information have a multidirec-
tional flow.  Electricity now flows from the end-user to the electricity grid, a 
pathway previously unavailable.  At the same time, information can now flow 
in multiple directions.  Automated Metering Infrastructure and smart meters 
allow for end-users to better understand and control their energy usage.77  That 
electricity prices vary throughout the day was previously an unleveraged fact; 
today, it is information that consumers can utilize through real-time pricing 
and demand response programs.78
Multidirectional information and energy flows afford multiple ben-
efits: end-users can save money, customers have more flexibility and choice, 
and environmental benefits flow from reduced energy waste.79  Multidirec-
72. Dennis et al., supra note 34, at 8.
73. Peter Fox-Penner, Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, & The 
Future of Electric Utilities 105–06 (2014).
74. See, e.g., Solar Initiatives, Washington, D.C. Dep’t of Energy & Environment, 
https://doee.dc.gov/service/solar-initiatives [https://perma.cc/3Z6F-J4KT] (last visited Nov. 
4, 2019) (describing how to add solar panels to the home, including links to installation com-
panies).
75. Fox-Penner, supra note 73, at 39–49.
76. Id. at 36–37.
77. Smart Meters and a Smarter Grid, Dep’t of Energy (May 16, 2011), https://www.
energy.gov/energysaver/articles/smart-meters-and-smarter-grid [https://perma.cc/XK7D-
QUMX].
78. Demand Response, Dep’t of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/oe/activities-
technology-development/grid-modernization-and-smart-grid/demand-response [https://
perma.cc/34VY-ZA5V] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
79. E.g., Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Understanding the Benefits of the Smart Grid 
1–2 (2010), https://www.netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/Smartgrid/06-18-2010_Understanding-
Smart-Grid-Benefits.pdf.
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tional flows support FERC’s mandate to ensure just and reasonable rates as 
well as reliable service, as novel sources of technology and information pro-
vide opportunity to reduce the cost of electricity in new ways.80  Evolutions in 
technology thus further the same goal that has always undergirded regulation 
of the industry: affordable electricity rates in furtherance of the public inter-
est, albeit in an entirely different manner than how the industry had previously 
accomplished this task.
However, changing the pathway has created stress upon a regulatory 
regime designed for a one-directional grid.81  Location was an important 
assumption to the legal and regulatory structures developed to close the Attle-
boro gap.  The language of the FPA itself alludes to such, with jurisdiction 
described on the basis of where along the energy pathway the transaction was 
made and whether the transaction was inter- or intrastate.82  Location likewise 
informed the jurisdictional analysis in the aftermath of the FPA’s passage and 
served as a rationale for bright-line jurisdiction.83  However, these foundational 
assumptions have changed.  Location, by itself, cannot be a sufficient marker 
for whether an action is wholly state or federal in nature.84  New technologies 
even blur the lines between wholesale and retail, another foundational assump-
tion for the bright-line jurisdictional analysis.85  Like restructuring, innovation 
and technology has created symptomatic stress upon the traditional regulatory 
structures.  Another foundational change has further catalyzed this symptom-
atic stress: evolving state policy priority towards climate action and preference 
for resources and technology that can advance that priority.
80. See, e.g., Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional 
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2018) 
[hereinafter Order No. 841] (allowing new resources, like energy storage, to participate in 
markets will ensure just and reasonable rates by increasing competition).
81. Dennis et al., supra note 34, at 8 (“These operational characteristics of new and 
emerging energy technologies do not fit as neatly into the FPA’s jurisdictional divisions.  With 
two-way power flow, there is not the same conceptual ‘hand off’ of jurisdiction from federal 
to state regulation as power flows . . . from generation through delivery to ultimate consump-
tion.”).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
83. E.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964) 
(“Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal juris-
diction . . . making FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in inter-
state commerce except those which Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by 
the States.”); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (seeking 
to fashion a bright-line in which “[s]tates retain exclusive authority to regulate the retail 
market”).
84. Dennis et al., supra note 34, at 8 (“[N]ew distributed energy resources (including 
energy storage) can be interconnected to either the FERC-jurisdictional high-voltage trans-
mission system or the state-jurisdictional low-voltage local distribution system (or behind 
the customer’s meter).”).
85. Id. (“[A]dvanced technologies    .  .  .  can provide services in both wholesale and 
retail markets.”).
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C. Evolving State Policy Preferences and Priorities
States have longstanding and traditional authority to craft law and policy 
in furtherance of their citizens’ welfare and wellbeing.86  This authority cuts 
across sectors and industries, and is the basis for actions that have intended and 
unintended impacts upon energy.  In response to incontrovertible “evidence 
that anthropogenic climate change is an existential threat,” with “potentially 
catastrophic consequences to human health and well-being,” states have used 
their authority to craft critical climate laws and policies.87  The National Cli-
mate Assessment’s findings highlighted the urgent need for climate action, 
with the most recent report stating that that if emissions continued at their 
current rate climate change would result in hundreds of billions of dollars in 
economic losses;88 threaten public infrastructure;89 degrade water quality for 
drinking, agriculture, and industrial use;90 endanger food security;91 detrimen-
tally impact ecosystems, ecosystem services, oceans and coasts;92 and much 
more.  Faced with these potentially “irreversible” consequences,93 states are 
utilizing longstanding traditional authority, including the authority retained 
under the FPA to implement strong decarbonization goals.94  The impact of 
this evolving policy priority is significant: twenty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio standards, and seven states and 
over one hundred cities have committed to 100 percent clean energy.95
86. See supra note 49; see also Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524–
25 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 306 (1997)) (“The 
Commerce Clause does not ‘cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the 
health, life, and safety of their citizens, [just because] the legislation might indirectly affect 
the commerce of the country.’”).
87. Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 Energy L.J. 1, 
2–3 (2019).
88. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment 
26 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id. at 29.
92. Id. at 29, 31.
93. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5 °C 5–7 
(2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15 (discussing the impacts of warming beyond 1.5 °C).
94. E.g., Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, CASE 15-E-0302, (N.Y. Pub. 
Service Comm’n, Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter NY Clean Energy Standard Order] (compen-
sating nuclear generation for the carbon free generation it provided in order to “preserve 
existing zero‐emissions nuclear generation resources as a bridge to the clean energy future,” 
and “prevent backsliding” on state decarbonization mandates).
95. 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties, & States, Sierra Club, https://www. 
sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments [https://perma.cc/8FXM-LZNC] (last visited Nov. 
21, 2019); Updated Renewable Portfolio Standards Will Lead to More Renewable Electricity 
Generation, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.: Today In Energy (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38492 [https://perma.cc/WB5B-CPJL].
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Current state action is structured to address citizens’ welfare and well-
being through environmental preference and climate priority.96  While this 
specific focus is new, state expression of a policy preference and priority is 
not new.  The electricity grid has relied upon multibillion dollar support from 
states and the federal government since its inception.97  These subsidies and 
incentives, many of which remain in effect, have primarily been directed to 
fossil-fuel resource owners.98  The relative merit of subsidies, historic and pres-
ent, is beyond the scope of this Article.  Relevant here, is that while the type 
of policy preference and priority has evolved to focus on climate benefits, the 
existence of policy preference in the electricity sector is not new.
The evolution in policy priority and preference to support urgent climate 
action has important implications for the power sector.  To meet state require-
ments, the system has, and must continue to, become cleaner.  This necessity 
will prioritize particular resource and planning decisions.  Like restructuring 
and new technologies, this evolution holds critical promise: a cleaner grid is 
necessary to respond to devastating threats of climate change.  Likewise, this 
evolution creates symptomatic stress upon a system designed for different 
policy preferences and priorities.99
III. Legal and Regulatory Response to Energy Transition
FERC, Congress, and states have remade law and regulation in response 
to changes altering the energy sector landscape.  This response mirrors the 
legal and regulatory response around Attleboro.  Foundational sector change—
today in the form of restructuring, technological innovation, and evolving 
policy preferences—required rapid updating to applicable law and regulation. 
Equally significant is how the legal and regulatory response departs from the 
context of Attleboro.
Congressional action closed the Attleboro gap.  Commensurate congres-
sional activity has not occurred in the wake of current foundational changes in 
the electric sector.  Rather, the FPA’s core provisions—carving out state author-
ity, ensuring just and reasonable rates, and prohibiting undue discrimination 
96. However, states are by design not uniform in policy intent, approach, or goal. 
While many states have assumed leadership roles in response to the growing threat created 
by climate change, others remain more committed to fossil fuel resources.
97. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at *52 (2018) 
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (“Since 1916, federal taxpayers have supported domestic explo-
ration, drilling, and production activities for our nation’s fossil fuel industry.  And since 1950, 
the federal government has provided roughly a trillion dollars in energy subsidies, of which 
65 percent has gone to fossil fuel technologies.”).
98. Oversees Dev. Inst., US G7 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Scorecard 2 (2018), https://www.
odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12217.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7S8-KSLV].
99. Order No. 841, supra note 80, at 9582 (“[B]arriers to the participation of new 
technologies, such as many types of electric storage resources, in the RTO/ISO markets can 
emerge when the rules governing participation in those markets are designed for traditional 
resources . . . .”).
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and preference—remain unchanged.  Federal legislation has been relatively 
limited and has worked to complement rather than supplant the FPA and 
FERC’s core authority.  In place of broad congressional action, regulatory 
reform has served as the federal government’s primary mechanism to respond 
to sector modernization.
The primarily regulatory response reflects the major distinction between 
Attleboro and today.  Rather than a regulatory gap due to a rapidly expanding 
grid, today’s foundational changes—increasing competition, new technologies, 
and evolving policy preferences—have spurred a regulatory overlap.  Today’s 
foundational changes have necessitated a regulatory response that has led 
to state and federal regulators having increasingly interrelated and intercon-
nected authority.  This mix of regulatory activity and complementary legislation 
without change to core FPA text has been sufficient and well-suited to realign-
ing the sector’s legal and regulatory regime to the sector’s evolving economic, 
engineering, and policy structures.100
A. Restructuring and ISOs
Restructuring, and the formation of ISOs required significant FERC 
leadership.  FERC set the stage for the formation of ISOs in Order No. 888, 
which “required mandatory open transmission access by all transmitting 
utilities” and promoted ISOs as the facilitators of this new open-access trans-
mission.101  Order No. 888 also contemplated that ISOs “would operate the 
transmission system independently of and foster competition for electricity 
generation among wholesale market participants.”102  Three years later, FERC 
issued Order No. 2000, which encouraged “utilities to join regional trans-
mission organizations  .  .  .  that, like an ISO, would operate the transmission 
systems and develop innovative procedures to manage transmission equita-
bly.”103  Order No. 2000 set ISOs’ minimum characteristics, like independence 
and short-term reliability, and functions; like tariff administration, design, and 
100. This Part provides a description of the legal and regulatory responses that is one of 
sector trends, not uniform and unwavering progression.  Progress has been uneven and non-
linear: FERC, states, and sector actors have deviated course in ways that is contrary to core 
FPA principles, undermines rather than harmonizes with state authority, and that supports 
anticompetitive and inefficient activity through market and quasimarket structures.  See 
Michael Panfil & Rama Zakaria, Uncovering Wholesale Electricity Market Principles, 8 Mich. 
J. Envtl. & Admin. L. (forthcoming 2019); Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting); ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC 
¶ 61,205 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part).  It is unlikely, 
however, that such deviations will stem the general trends described above.  Although 
uneven, legal and regulatory structures continue to update in reflection of sector modern-
ization.  Indeed, increasing familiarity with competitive market structures, new technologies 
and entrants, and evolving policy preferences only further supports this forward march.
101. FERC Energy Primer, supra note 11, at 39–40.
102. Id. at 40.
103. Id.
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market monitoring.104  Both Orders were intended to “enhance the benefits 
of competitive electricity markets” through encouragement of independent 
transmission grid operators.105
FERC has only further imbued competition into its foundation since 
Order Nos. 888 and 2000.  The Commission’s precedent is clear, and concludes 
that competition is the most efficient means to ensuring just and reasonable 
rates.106  In ISO regions, FERC generally allows for market-based rates and dis-
favors cost-based rates, with the latter only permitted in narrow, time-limited 
instances and only as a “last resort.”107  ISOs reflect this competitive foundation; 
their filed tariffs and mission statements express an obligation to “create and 
sustain open, non-discriminatory, competitive, unbundled markets.”108  Capac-
ity markets were developed to provide a new revenue stream to supplement 
competitive wholesale energy markets.  Although many view capacity markets 
as failure in practice, their underlying theory was premised upon an interest in 
encouraging investment in new generation capacity through a market-based 
mechanism.109  FERC required their markets to use a locational marginal price 
to support “optimal investment in resources” and to provide compensation 
that would incentivize capacity growth (and therefore competition) in areas 
of congestion.110  This preference not only supports restructuring and compe-
104. Order No. 2000, supra note 62, at 811.
105. E.g., id.
106. See, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 150 FERC ¶ 61,116, ¶ 61,118 (2015); ISO New 
England, Inc., 148 FERC ¶  61,179, ¶  61,222 (2014); ISO New England, Inc., 151 FERC 
¶ 61,052 (2014); PJM Interconnection LLC, 110 FERC ¶ 61,053, ¶ 61,084 (2005); Midwest 
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 108 FERC ¶ 61,163, ¶ 61,466 n.226 (2004); see also 
Panfil & Zakaria, supra note 100.
107. Specifically, the Commission has consistently made clear that reliability-must-run 
(RMR) agreements must be used only as a last resort.  Devon Power LLC, 103 FERC 
¶ 61,082, ¶ 61,113 (2003); see also Bridgeport Energy, LLC, 118 FERC ¶ 61,243, ¶ 61,284 
(2007); Berkshire Power Co., 112 FERC ¶ 61,253, ¶ 61,275 (2005); Devon Power LLC, 110 
FERC ¶ 61,315, ¶ 61,350 (2005).  RMR agreements were rejected “out of concern about 
the effect widespread use of such contracts could have on the competitive market.”  Devon 
Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, ¶ 61,347 (2006).
108. ISO New England, Transmission, Markets, & Services Tariff § I.1.3(b) (2019); 
see also PJM’s Mission & Vision, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/ mission-
vision.aspx [https://perma.cc/K6TE-M8LT] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019) (“Create and oper-
ate robust, competitive, and non-discriminatory electric power markets.”); N.Y. Indep. Sys. 
Operator, 2018–2022 Strategic Plan 8 (2017), https://www.nyiso.com/ documents/20142/2
225883/2018+NYISO+Strategic+Plan.pdf/89d8a887-1b70-b163-99d0-0a91cfa6d497 [https://
perma.cc/BE2D-GX89] (“Operating a fair and competitive electric wholesale markets.”).
109. See Flores-Espino et al., supra note 36, at 16; Rob Gramlich & Michael Goggin, 
Too Much of the Wrong Thing: The Need for Capacity Market Replacement or Reform, Grid 
Strategies LLC (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/too-much-of-
the-wrong-thing-the-need-for-capacity-market-replacement-or-reform.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2HRP-FSE6] (critiquing current wholesale capacity market structures).
110. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, ¶ 61,346–47, ¶ 61,405 (quoting New 
England Power Pool and ISO New England, Inc., 100 FERC ¶ 61,287, ¶ 61,388 (2002)).
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tition, but also supports ISOs as the mechanism to house that competition. 
FERC has, for example, long provided membership incentives to transmis-
sion owners when they join an ISO.111  FERC recently emphatically rejected 
proposals to explicitly favor certain resources and affirmed its commitment to 
competition as a foundational agency principle.112
Congressional support benefited restructuring, competition, and the 
development of ISOs.113  First, in 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Reg-
ulatory Policy Act (PURPA).114  This legislation encouraged competition in 
the energy sector by providing incentives to small scale generating facilities 
that met the requirements of “qualifying facilities.”115  States set the price to 
be paid to these qualifying generators, which, depending on price, could spur 
rapid growth of renewables.116  Heralded by some as “the most effective single 
measure in promoting renewable energy,”117  PURPA was able to unlock new 
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 824s(c) (2012) (“[T]he Commission shall  .  .  . provide for incen-
tives to each transmitting utility or electric utility that joints a Transmission Organization.”); 
Promoting Transmission Investment Through Price Reform, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057, ¶ 61,383 
(2006) [hereinafter Order No. 679] (providing a return-on-equity incentive for public utilities 
that join or continue to be a member of an ISO).
112. FERC’s foundational preference for competition, ISOs, and market structures 
has been tested most recently by a Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Power Act 
section 403 proposal, which requested the Commission grant coal and nuclear genera-
tors guaranteed cost-based rates in place of competitive market-based rates.  See Grid 
Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (Oct. 10, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35); Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, ¶ 61,014 (2018) [here-
inafter 403 Denial Order].  The Commission denied DOE’s proposal in a 5–0 decision, 
emphasizing that its preference for competitive market structures is premised upon the 
core statutory responsibility to ensure just and reasonable rates.  See id. ¶¶  61,012–21. 
FERC made clear that cost-bate rate structures were best left to the ash heap of history 
and that it would continue to use the markets it had overseen development of for the last 
two decades, noting that its “support of competitive wholesale electricity markets has been 
grounded in the substantial and well-documented economic benefits that these markets 
provide to consumers.”  Id. ¶ 61,023.  The Commission also noted that in Order No. 890 it 
had relied on a “DOE study that found that competition had reduced consumers’ bills by 
billions of dollars a year.”  Id. (citing Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in 
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, ¶ 31,301 (2007) and 
Dep’t of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study (2002)).
113. See Lyons, supra note 2, at 931–36 (providing further details on the role of PURPA 
and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 in opening the grid to competition and ultimately render-
ing the jurisdictional bright line obsolete).
114. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (1978).
115. FERC Energy Primer, supra note 11, at 39.
116. See id. (noting that while some states set the price too low, others set high rates and 
were “overwhelmed with QF capacity”).
117. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), Union of Concerned Scientists 
(July 15, 2002), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/strengthen- 
policy/public-utility-regulatory.html [https://perma.cc/3N79-SW9L] (also arguing that it is 
the “only existing federal law that requires competition in the utility industry and the only 
law that encourages renewables”).
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competition in the energy sector.118  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 encour-
aged further competition by providing FERC with the authority to grant 
transmission access on request.119  This ensured that FERC could provide for 
open-access, which would lead to greater competition by expanding markets 
for independent power producers.120
States have also been active in efforts to restructure the electricity sector. 
At the same time FERC began promoting competitive markets, states began 
requiring utilities within their jurisdiction to divest their generation assets, 
breaking up longstanding vertically integrated companies.121  States also facil-
itated restructuring by permitting their utilities to join ISOs and participate in 
the competitive markets.122  Furthermore, as of 2017, thirteen states and Wash-
ington, D.C., have restructured their retail markets.123
Taken together, the legal and regulatory response to sector change 
exhibits clear preference for competitive market mechanisms.  This preference 
expressed itself in response to the modernizing elements described above, with 
economic theory emphasizing restructuring ultimately successful in pushing 
competition over monopolistic industry structures and outcomes.  This new-
found preference and FERC’s corresponding regulatory response has raised 
tension on jurisdictional issues and increased litigation concerning how to 
divvy responsibility in the wake of ISOs and competition.124
118. See Richard J. Campbell, Cong. Research Serv., R42923, Electrical Power: 
Overview of Congressional Issues 1 (2013).
119. FERC Energy Primer, supra note 11, at 39.
120. Flores-Espino et al., supra note 36, at 8.
121. Id. at 9.
122. See, e.g., Bentham Paulos, A Regional Power Market for the West 15, 21 (2018) 
(noting that regionalization of CAISO was not likely to receive the needed approval from 
states outside of California, and also describing opposition to California state laws that 
would allow for regionalization).
123. Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., An Introduction to Retail Electricity Choice 
in the United States (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/68993.pdf [https://perma.
cc/73KP-24WE].
124. This is primarily an issue in the two-thirds of the country where ISOs have estab-
lished market-based rate regimes.  In traditionally regulated states, where ISOs and whole-
sale competition does not exist, electricity sector regulation remains primarily in the control 
of state authorities, and that authority is “at its maximum.”  Boyd & Carlson, supra note 52, at 
836.  That one-third of the country remains traditionally regulated is an important difference 
between the legal and regulatory response today and that after Attleboro.  The congressional 
response to Attleboro, passage of the FPA, necessarily applied with equal force throughout 
the United States.  The current legal and regulatory response, however, has adopted a decid-
edly patchwork approach.  This outcome was not purposeful: ISOs and regional variability 
arose from the ashes of standard market design.  Id. at 832–33.  Yet emphasis on respecting 
regional diversity and differences has taken hold, both in practice and design.  E.g., New 
England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v. ISO New England, 150 FERC ¶ 61,064, ¶ 61,083 
(2015) (“[M]arket design and rules need not be identical among the regions to be just and 
reasonable.”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶  61,063, ¶  61,102 (2007) (“[T]he 
Commission has permitted different just and reasonable rate designs reflective of particular 
2020 FROM ATTLEbORO TO EPSA 23
B. Technological Advances
Like restructuring, new technology and entrants have created pressure 
upon the traditional legal and regulatory structures undergirding the power 
sector.  FERC, Congress, and states have responded by crafting new law, reg-
ulation, and policy to encourage the development of new technologies and 
entrants, in pursuit of the benefits they could provide.
FERC has taken concrete steps to actively support innovation and tech-
nological advances, through its own action and by approving ISO market 
proposals.125  Like the regulatory actions described in the Part above, the scope 
of FERC’s and ISO’s actions are unified by the same direction and statu-
tory goal: to provide reliable electric service at just and reasonable rates, and 
through not unduly discriminatory or preferential means.  While technological 
innovation has changed the pathway, this goal remains the same.
FERC Order Nos. 719, 745, and 841 are emblematic of this evolving 
pathway.  Order Nos. 719 and 745, which allowed demand response participa-
tion in wholesale energy markets, and Order No. 841, which allowed energy 
storage participation in wholesale power markets, gave technology-enabled 
resources commensurate access to market structures previously available to 
only traditional generating stations.126  The Orders, premised on the Commis-
sion’s statutory obligation to ensure just and reasonable rates, concluded that 
allowing demand response and energy storage to participate enabled more 
affordable electricity.127
Demand response and energy storage resources are representative 
of the technological innovation that is fundamentally changing the energy 
sector, particularly the multidirectional nature of the grid.  Both demand 
response and energy storage can be located on the distribution system or 
system characteristics and stakeholder input.  In this regard, we have stated our deference 
to regional preferences a number of times, for instance in Order No. 2000, and in PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., 96 FERC ¶ 61,060, ¶ 61,220 (2001), as well as in our approval of rate 
designs for different regional markets.”); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 126 FERC ¶ 61,320, 
¶ 61,360 (2009) (“[T]here can be more than one just and reasonable planning process and 
RTOs and ISOs [Independent System Operators] are not required to have identical planning 
processes . . . ”).  The modern electricity sector resists simple categorization, and even ISOs 
are far from uniform: one-third of the United States remain outside an ISO-footprint; four of 
the seven ISOs run wholesale capacity markets; one of those four is voluntary.
125. See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 125 
FERC ¶ 61,071 (2008) [hereinafter Order No. 719]; Demand Response Compensation in 
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (2011) [hereinafter Order No. 
745]; Order No. 841, supra note 80.
126. See supra note 125; see also Michael Panfil, Demand Response and the Story of 
this Clean Energy Resource, Medium (Apr. 24, 2015), https://medium.com/@EDFEnergyEX/
how-the-electricity-world-has-changed-cdb4e56b9b24 (providing a detailed explanation of 
demand response resources and Order No. 745).
127. Order No. 719, supra note 125, ¶ 61,072; Order No. 745, supra note 125, ¶ 61,189, 
¶ 61,197; Order No. 841, supra note 80, ¶ 61,128.
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behind-the-meter, colocated with what has traditionally been considered 
load.128  Demand response, while participating as a generator in wholesale mar-
kets, is not traditional “generation”; it is load reduction used to balance the grid 
in the same manner as a traditional generation asset.129  Multidirectional flow 
of information likewise supports and is supported by these demand response 
and energy storage resources.  Both demand response and energy storage can 
be aggregated by third-party entities that rely upon instantaneous and granular 
communication to ensure participation when called upon by grid operators.130
FERC, through Order Nos. 719, 745, and 841, recognized the fundamental 
change ongoing in the electricity sector.  The Commission’s response connected 
its foundational statutory obligations to the evolving physical structure of the 
electricity grid.  The Orders acknowledged that these new resources “must 
often use existing participating models designed for traditional generation or 
load resources that do not recognize [their] unique physical and operational 
characteristics and their capability to provide capacity, energy, and ancillary 
services in the RTO/ISO markets.”131  FERC understood that these resources 
were technologically different than traditional generating resources and that 
the regulatory system needed to account for those differences appropriately.
Although the FPA’s core statutory text has remained unchanged, Con-
gress has still made clear its interest in supporting new grid technologies.  As 
discussed above, PURPA and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 both encouraged 
competition from new resources.132  In particular, PURPA provided pathways 
to allow new technologies, like renewables, to compete.  Furthermore, through 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress amended PURPA to include provisions 
128. Order on Rehearing and Clarification, Electric Storage Participation in Markets 
Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 167 
FERC ¶ 61,154, ¶ 61,193 (2019) [hereinafter Order No. 841-A] (concluding that the decision 
in FERC v. EPSA allows FERC to regulate participation of resources that are located on a 
distribution system or behind-the-meter); Order on Rehearing and Clarification, 137 FERC 
¶ 61,215, ¶ 61,281 (2011) [hereinafter Order No. 745-A] (disagreeing that the fact that the 
“existence of behind the meter generation” is problematic for the validity of Order No. 745).
129. Order No. 745, supra note 125, ¶ 61,196 (explaining how demand response operates 
in the wholesale market to reduce consumption); Order No. 841-A, supra note 128, ¶ 61,207 
(discussing the fact that demand response resources, unlike energy storage resources, do not 
involve a sale of electric energy, but instead involves a “reduction in the consumption of 
electricity”); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 769–70 (2016) (explaining the 
way demand response resources contribute to the grid).
130. FERC Energy Primer, supra note 11, at 46 (explaining curtailment service pro-
viders).  See generally Demand Response Enabling Technology Development, Ctr. for Built 
Env’t, https://cbe.berkeley.edu/project/demand-response-enabling-technology-development 
[https://perma.cc/DVR6-PSB6] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
131. Order No. 841, supra note 80, ¶ 61,138; see also Order No. 719, supra note 125, 
¶ 61,089 (describing the various services that demand response resources have been capable 
of providing).
132. See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text.
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relating to, and encouraging, net metering and demand response.133  There Con-
gress also stated it was “the policy of the United States . . . that unnecessary 
barriers to demand response participation in energy, capacity, and ancillary 
service markets shall be eliminated.”134  Similarly, the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 provided that it was United States policy to “support 
the modernization of the Nation’s electricity and transmission and distribu-
tion system . . . to achieve [a set of requirements that] together characterize a 
Smart Grid.” 135  The Act also required the Department of Energy to provide 
Congress with a Smart Grid System Report, which would include information 
on “the status of smart grid deployments nationwide and any regulatory or 
government barriers to continued deployment.”136  In 2008, Congress also pro-
vided $4.5 billion to DOE to modernize the electric power grid through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).137  DOE used 
that funding to provide Smart Grid Investment Grants to modernization proj-
ects,138 and by 2016 the program had supported installation of sixteen million 
smart meters.139  ARRA also provided funding to help stimulate the growth 
of energy storage resources, which helped increase storage by 500 percent 
between 2012 and 2015.140  Collectively, these statutes directed federal agen-
cies to make grid modernization a priority and compelled them to act, whether 
it be through monetary assistance, data collection, or regulatory action.
States have likewise made important strides in enabling and recognizing 
evolving grid technologies.  Smart meters, necessary devices in enabling mul-
tidirectional flows of information, were rapidly deployed in the early 2010’s. 
By 2018 there were 86.8 million smart meter installations across the coun-
try.141  Several states have led efforts to enable access for new technologies and 
133. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, §§ 1251–1254, 119 Stat. 594, 962–71 
(2005).
134. Id. § 1252(f).
135. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, § 1301–1302, 
121 Stat. 1492, 1783–84 (2007).
136. Id.
137. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 
115, 138–39 (2009); Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program, Dep’t 
Energy, https://www.energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act-smart-grid-investment-
grant-sgig-program [https://perma.cc/655M-NW6K] (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).
138. Recovery Act: Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program, supra note 136.
139. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The Recovery Act Made the Largest Single 
Investment in Clean Energy in History, Driving the Deployment of Clean Energy, Promoting 
Energy Efficiency and Supporting Manufacturing (Feb. 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-recovery-act-made-largest-single- 
investment-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/PE55-5TEP].
140. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 
115, 138 (2009) (“[T]he secretary shall provide facility funding awards under this section to 
manufacturers of advanced battery systems and vehicle batteries . . . .”); White House Press 
Release, supra note 139.
141. Frequently Asked Questions, Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/
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entrants at the retail level, with programs rolling out in 2019 and 2020, includ-
ing California’s default Time of Use tariff and energy storage mandate, Illinois’ 
real time pricing pilot, and New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision regula-
tory strategy.142
FERC activity, congressional action, and state leadership have supported 
innovative technologies.  The sector’s continuing adoption of such technolo-
gies is premised on longstanding statutory mandates and goals.  Technological 
innovation provides new pathways to realize those longstanding objectives, 
and FERC, Congress, and states have responded by crafting legal and regula-
tory structures well-suited for the evolving grid.  However, in pursuing their 
goals to accommodate and encourage grid modernization and technological 
advancement, federal and state entities have placed tension on the traditional 
jurisdictional bright-line that relegated their actions to promoting and regulat-
ing technology on their respective sides.
C. Evolving State Policy Preferences and Priorities
Evolving policy preferences and priorities at the state level have, like 
restructuring and technological innovation, led to a regulatory response.  This 
response to state policy in furtherance of climate action should be understood 
within the context of existing and longstanding interplay between federal and 
state entities in the power sector.  As examined above, this interplay is a natu-
ral progression that is reflective of the manner in which the grid expanded from 
intra- to interstate machine and the FPA’s explicit retention of state author-
ity following Attleboro.143  This explicit state role is similar in some ways to 
the FPA’s establishment of FERC’s just and reasonable and not unduly dis-
criminatory standard: both elements are core to the statute’s construction and 
both provide flexibility in ensuring regulatory regimes meet their founda-
tional purpose.
faq.php?id=108&t=3 [https://perma.cc/W24Q-RWZK] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019) (providing 
2018 deployment numbers); Nearly Half of All U.S. Electricity Customers Have Smart Meters, 
Energy Info. Admin. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34012 
[https://perma.cc/5S9K-VKP4] (“Installations of smart meters have more than doubled since 
2010.”).
142. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 2835–2839 (Deering 2009) (codifying California’s Energy 
Storage Mandate); Time of Use Rulemaking/R.15–12–012, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, https://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=12180 [https://perma.cc/ACE2-ZUYA] (discussing 
California’s Time of Use rulemaking); Ill. Commerce Comm’n, Verified Petition for Approval 
of a Revision to Integrated Distribution Company Implementation Plan, Envtl. Def. Fund 
(Nov. 16, 2018), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/files/2018/11/ComEd-Verified-Petition-
w-Attachment-A.pdf (Commonwealth Edison requesting approval from Illinois regulators 
to implement a four-year time-of-use pilot program); REV: Reforming the Energy Vision, 
N.Y. State Energy Planning Bd. (2016), https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
WhitePaperREVMarch2016.pdf (describing New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision 
plan).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
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As states have used their policymaking authority to drive decarboniza-
tion, FERC has considered whether traditional regulatory structures remain 
well-suited to connecting the FPA’s careful reservation of state authority to 
the current realities of the sector.  That is, because the type of state policy pref-
erence has evolved to focus on climate action in the context of a restructured 
wholesale energy sector, FERC has increasingly considered whether its regu-
latory regime effectively ensures those preferences are respected as required 
by the FPA.144
Commission activity in this space has been fluid, uneven, and more 
recently, troubling.  Positive steps are clearly visible; Order No. 1000, for exam-
ple, required that state policies, such as renewable portfolio standards, be 
considered in transmission planning.145  California Independent System Opera-
tor (CAISO) implemented the first and only FERC-approved multistate RTO 
dispatch carbon price in its Energy Imbalance Market.146  Two other ISOs, 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and PJM Interconnection 
(PJM), have considered integrating carbon pricing into their wholesale energy 
markets as a means to harmonize their markets with state climate policy.147 
FERC has likewise made it clear that the state—not the federal government—
retains authority over the sale of environmental components of power, so 
long as that sale is not impermissibly “bundled” with the energy value of the 
resource.148  Hence, FERC has responded to evolving policy preferences by 
better linking its FPA mandate to sector realities.
FERC’s response to state public policy has been regressive in other 
areas.149  Two 2018 Commission Orders, in response to proposals by ISO New 
144. For example, in 2017 FERC held a technical conference on state public policies and 
their impact on wholesale markets. State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO 
New England Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, 
LLC; Notice of Technical Conference, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,331 (Mar. 10, 2017).
145. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2011) [hereinafter Order No. 1000] 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2019)).
146. See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 147 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2014).
147. See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, IPPTF Carbon Pricing Proposal (2018), https://www.
nyiso.com/documents/20142/2244202/IPPTF-Carbon-Pricing-Proposal.pdf; PJM Outlines 
Plan to Study Market Effects of Carbon Pricing, PJM (May 17, 2019), http://insidelines.pjm.com/
pjm-outlines-plan-to-study-market-effects-of-carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/WH6B-3G3Q].
148. WSPP, Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061, ¶ 61,425 (2012) (“[W]e conclude that unbundled 
REC transactions fall outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction . .  .  .”); American Ref-Fuel 
Co., 105 FERC ¶  61,004, ¶¶  61,027–28 (2003) (explaining that states control unbundled 
RECs, including “who owns the REC in the initial instance, and how they may be sold or 
traded”).
149. Whether the current response is a permanent shift or a short-lived deviation is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Regardless, the situation provides an important example 
of how the foundational changes in the electricity sector are prompting regulatory response 
and creating tensions that will need to be resolved through the ‘collaborative federalism’ 
framework.
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England (ISO-NE) and PJM to alter their capacity market designs, serve as 
examples of concerns that FERC may be considering extending its authority in 
ways that undermine state authority.150  The ISO-NE and PJM proposals—and 
FERC’s response—focused upon the impacts of state public policies on whole-
sale capacity market operation.  In furtherance of state climate goals, the state 
policies at issue compensated clean energy generators for the zero-emission 
benefits they provided.151  FERC has asserted that these actions, while taken 
pursuant to states’ longstanding authority to pursue policy in furtherance of 
their citizens’ welfare and wellbeing and authority over generating facilities, 
can impact the price at which generators bid into wholesale markets, thereby 
indirectly impacting wholesale rates.  The FERC Orders premised their action 
on the assumption that those impacts should be negated through changes to 
wholesale market design.152  More recently, FERC has taken steps that build 
upon these two FERC Orders in ways that signal troubling willingness to 
undermine, rather than nurture, jurisdictional interplay and valid exercise 
of state policy authority.153  In a late 2019 Order centered on PJM’s capac-
ity market, FERC doubled down upon the logic embedded in the two 2018 
PJM and ISO-NE Orders, and chose to “zero out any state effort to address 
the externalities associated with sales of electricity” by effectively walling off 
wholesale capacity markets from any state-policy supported resource.154  The 
Order’s premise, that state policy actions authorize FERC “to block any state 
effort to economically regulate the externalities associated with electricity 
generation is not a reasonable interpretation of the FPA’s balance between 
federal and state jurisdiction.”155
150. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, ¶ 61,244 (2018); 
ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, passim (2018).
151. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶¶ 61,236–39; ISO New England, 162 FERC ¶ 61,209.
152. Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶¶ 61,257–60; ISO New England, 162 FERC ¶ 61,209; see 
also Brief for the United States and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Respondents and Affirmance at 19–22, Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 17–2433 and 17–2445), 2018 WL 2746229 
(explaining that if zero emission credit policies impermissibly affected wholesale markets, it 
would be considered through the administrative process).
153. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019).
154. Id. at *17 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
155. Id.  For a thoughtful critique of certain FERC’s actions that undermine state cli-
mate change objectives and impose market structures designed for fossil-fuel resources, see 
Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market 
Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 Yale J. on Reg. Bull. 106 (2018).  This same 
tension is on display in NYISO, with the New York Public Service Commission and New 
York Energy Research and Development Authority filing a 206 complaint against the ISO 
in late July 2019. Complaint on Behalf of the N.Y. State Pub. Serv Comm’n and the N.Y. 
State Energy Research and Dev. Auth. and Request for Fast Track Processing, N.Y. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, No. EL-19–86 (FERC July, 29, 2019) [herein-
after NYPSC Complaint].  The New York state entities argue that the filing, which applies 
buyer-side mitigation measures (through an offer floor) to electric storage resources (ESR), 
not only violates Order 841’s requirement that market barriers to ESR participation be 
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Notwithstanding troubling, recent developments, the instances described 
above demonstrate that foundational change has led to a regulatory response, 
which has created jurisdictional friction.156  This friction has resulted in litiga-
tion that pits federal and state authority against each other.157  Significantly, this 
response has spurred the judiciary to move from a ‘bright-line’ jurisdictional 
framework, described above, to a ‘collaborative federalism’ jurisdictional 
framework.  As described below, this interpretive framework allowed the 
courts to better resolve jurisdictional disputes in a manner that harmonizes 
the FPA’s statutory structure and division of authority with the foundational 
changes that have modernized the electricity sector.
IV. Collaborative Federalism
As the electricity industry has modernized, and as FERC, Congress, and 
states have responded, case law has accumulated with increasing speed.  These 
cases, like Attleboro, are symptomatic of the industry’s evolution.  They like-
wise center upon a familiar issue: whether a particular action, sitting upon a 
jurisdictional fault line, is within state or federal control.  As described above, 
this issue is not caused by a regulatory gap but a regulatory overlap.  Courts 
have recognized that a ‘collaborative federalism’ framework is best suited to 
adjudicating disputes created from this regulatory overlap.
This Part examines the judiciary’s adoption of collaborative federal-
ism due to the fundamental changes underway in the energy sector and the 
legal and regulatory response.  Emblematic cases are highlighted and explored 
below, namely (1) New York v. FERC, in the context of Order No. 888, 
removed, but also “improperly interferes with legitimate state actions that fall within the 
regulatory authority reserved to states under the FPA.”  Id. at 4.  The state entities argue the 
NYISO mitigation “would counteract State decisions and interfere with State policy objec-
tives regarding the mix of generation resources that should be used to provide a reliable 
source of energy while satisfying energy and environmental policy objectives that serve the 
public health, safety, and welfare of state residents.”  Id. at 32.  The state entities assert that 
such an outcome would directly contravene the collaborative federalism framework of the 
FPA, where “federal authority should not be exercised in [such] a manner” and “Federal and 
State interests should instead be balanced.”  Id. at 32–33.
156. Whether the 2018 and 2019 FERC Orders described above are examples of time-
bound, symptomatic friction or a fundamental regulatory shift remains to be seen.
157. For example, the Zero Emission Credit program cases pit state policy preferences 
that provided environmental subsidies against restructuring and wholesale market rate set-
ting authority.  Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018); Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2018).  The litigation surrounding 
Order No. 745 and demand response resources pit all three against each other: states sought 
to maintain sole authority over demand response while FERC attempted to establish its 
own authority over this new technology by bringing it into wholesale markets.  FERC v. 
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 763 (2016).  The same will be true for the appellate 
litigation related to Order No. 841 and energy storage, in which no opt-out to accommodate 
state policies has been provided, creating an even deeper tension between state and federal 
authority.  Order No. 841-A, supra note 128.
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restructuring, and the advent of ISOs; (2) FERC v. Electric Power Supply Asso-
ciation (EPSA), in the context of Order No. 745 and technological innovation; 
and (3) Coalition for Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman and EPSA v. Star, in 
the context of the Illinois Future Energy Jobs Act, the New York Clean Energy 
Standard, and evolving state policy preferences.
A. Restructuring: New York v. FERC
FERC Order No. 888, as described above, was a regulatory response to 
restructuring and the advent of ISOs.  The order, in turn, created its own symp-
tomatic response, with New York bringing challenge, ultimately before the 
Supreme Court.  The case centered on whether FERC exceeded its jurisdiction 
in Order No. 888 by requiring a “utility to transmit competitors’ electricity over 
its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmis-
sions” and whether FERC must also “impose that [open access] requirement 
on utilities that continue to offer only ‘bundled’ retail sales.”158  FERC had 
asserted jurisdiction over unbundled, but not bundled retail transmission ser-
vice.159  Thus, the primary jurisdictional question raised was whether FERC had 
authority to regulate unbundled retail transmission service that was sold sepa-
rately from the retail power service.160
New York v. FERC is perhaps the first observable instance of the Supreme 
Court’s movement to a collaborative federalism framework.161  In doing so, the 
Court’s rationale underlying its decision holds significance far beyond the spe-
cifics of Order No. 888.  At the outset of the decision, the Court frames the 
case in the language of change, stating that “[i]n 1935, when the FPA became 
law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities . . . .  Competi-
tion among utilities was not prevalent.”162  The Court contrasts 1935 with 
the modern day: “[E]specially beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the number 
of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically.  Technological advances 
have made it possible to generate electricity efficiently in different ways and 
in smaller plants.”163  The Court describes the legal and regulatory response, 
noting that Congress has supported competition in the sector through PURPA 
and the Energy Policy Act of 1992.164  The opinion notes how Order No. 888 
158. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2002).
159. Id. at 26.  FERC found that it was not necessary to assert jurisdiction over bundled 
retail transmission in order to deal with the wholesale market issue it faced, and believed 
that its regulation of bundled retail transmission raised jurisdictional issues that it again did 
not need to address in Order No. 888.  Id. at 26–28.  The Court agreed on both of these points 
upholding FERC’s decision to forego an assertion of jurisdiction against challenge by indus-
try.  Id. at 28–29.
160. Id. at 16–17.
161. Rossi, supra note 2, at 428 (describing New York v. FERC as “the first sign that dual 
sovereignty was destined to fall”).
162. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 9.
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itself was premised on an interest in promoting competition in the sector, with 
a foundation not upon new laws, but upon the FPA’s core statutory require-
ment that FERC remedy “unduly discriminatory practices.”165
The Court recognizes in New York v. FERC that the energy sector has 
and continues to fundamentally change.  The Court understands that change 
to be materially significant, holding that “the landscape of the electric industry 
has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was 
‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales.’”166  The Court’s 
movement away from a bright-line jurisdictional framework is premised upon 
an interest in identifying a pathway to adjudicate disputes over a swiftly chang-
ing sector that resists simple division.  In doing so, the Court clarified that it is 
not creating new jurisdictional bounds, but instead acknowledged that the FPA 
can be understood and applied in novel contexts.
The Court held that Order No. 888 was consistent with the jurisdictional 
interplay between state and federal authorities.  In so doing, it recognized that 
it was the sector itself that had changed, with the Court citing as evidence 
that “unbundled transmissions have been a recent development” and relying 
on FERC’s explanation that “at the time that the FPA was enacted, transmis-
sions were bundled with the energy itself, and electricity was delivered to both 
wholesale and retail customers as a complete, bundled package.  Thus, in 1935, 
there was neither state nor federal regulation of what did not exist.”167  FERC’s 
regulatory response was thus, one where:
[r]ather than claiming ‘new’ jurisdiction, the Commission is applying the 
same statutory framework to a business environment in which . . . retail sales 
and transmission service are provided in separate transactions . . .  Because 
these types of products and transactions were not prevalent in the past, the 
jurisdictional issue before us did not arise and . . . the Commission cannot 
be viewed as ‘disturbing’ the jurisdiction of state regulators prior to and 
after the Attleboro case.168
The Court in New York v. FERC ultimately determined the issue pre-
sented to it on the basis of FERC’s authority over transmission assets and 
refrained from going further;169 the holding did not provide the sector any addi-
tional specificity as to what framework it would employ in place of bright-line 
jurisdiction.  This issue was instead taken up by the Supreme Court in the 2016 
case, FERC v. EPSA.
165. Id. at 11.
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id. at 21.
168. Id. at 21 n.13 (quoting Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs 
by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888-A, 78 FERC ¶ 61,220, ¶ 61,680 
(1997)) (omissions in original).
169. Id. at 17 (focusing on the lack of any “language in the statute limiting FERC’s 
transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC’s 
sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale”).
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B. Technological Advances: FERC v. EPSA
The Commission crafted FERC Order No. 745, described above, in 
response to technological innovation and the advent of widescale demand 
response.  Like Order No. 888, parties quickly challenged Order No. 745; they 
asserted that FERC had overstepped its jurisdiction in requiring ISOs to com-
pensate demand response resources in wholesale energy markets.170  EPSA’s 
argument was predicated upon a bright-line reading of the FPA, reasoning that 
FERC’s action unlawfully overstepped into state jurisdiction because demand 
response resources stemmed from distribution-level retail customers.171  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, rejecting EPSA’s location-premised jurisdictional 
argument, stating that “wholesale and retail markets in electricity are inextri-
cably linked.”172  The Court held that it was, “a fact of economic life that the 
wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every other known product, 
are not hermetically sealed from each other.  To the contrary, transactions that 
occur on the wholesale market have natural consequences at the retail level.”173
Bright-line jurisdiction provides a court little help in adjudicating dis-
putes when line drawing is no longer of legal significance.  Rather, the EPSA 
decision used a collaborative federalism framework in evaluating jurisdictional 
disputes under the FPA.  The Court held that when FERC takes “virtually any 
action respecting wholesale transactions,” it has at least some effect on retail 
rates.174  However, that effect “is of no legal consequence.”175  This is the case 
even if FERC’s regulation of the wholesale market “substantially” impacts 
retail sales.176  While the specific questions a court should consider in deter-
mining the legality of a regulation were not proffered in this case, the Court 
did make clear that bright-line rules were not suited to the modern grid, and 
replaced them with the more role-specific inquiry of collaborative federal-
ism.  Specifically, the Court in FERC v. EPSA enunciated a framework that 
upholds FERC activity when the practices “directly affect” wholesale rates of 
electricity.177  The Court clarified why it now favors a collaborative federal-
ism framework:
Since the FPA’s passage, electricity has increasingly become a competitive 
interstate business, and FERC’s role has evolved accordingly.  Decades 
ago, state or local utilities controlled their own power plants, transmission 
lines, and delivery systems, operating as vertically integrated monopolies 
in confined geographic areas.  That is no longer so.  Independent power 
plants now abound, and almost all electricity flows not through “the local 
170. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
171. Id. at 776–77.
172. Id. at 766.
173. Id. at 776.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 774 (adopting the “directly affect” test from the D.C. Circuit).
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power networks of the past,” but instead through an interconnected “grid” 
of near-nationwide scope.178
The Court’s decision thus recognized that the ongoing energy transition 
had created new pressures upon the sector.  These pressures have resulted in 
regulatory response, here in the form of FERC Order No. 745.  The Court con-
nects longstanding FPA requirements to a modernizing sector by employing a 
jurisdictional framework that can respond to a sector that is no longer “her-
metically sealed.”179
C. Evolving State Policy Preferences: Challenges to Zero Emission Credits
Illinois and New York have taken leading action in responding to the 
threat of climate change.  In 2016, both states crafted path breaking policy—
Illinois through the Future Energy Jobs Act (FEJA) and New York through the 
Clean Energy Standard (CES)—to address climate change in furtherance of 
their citizens’ welfare and wellbeing.180  The FEJA and CES were both reflec-
tions of a changing, climate-focused policy preference, as described above. 
Both worked to effectuate this policy preference through a number of imple-
ments, including a “zero emission credit” (ZEC) meant to compensate “nuclear 
resources for the emissions reduction they provide, as a bridge to a clean energy 
future without risk of backsliding on decarbonization mandates.”181
Like Order Nos. 888 and 745, the FEJA and CES were quickly challenged 
in court.  Plaintiffs in both cases challenged the ZEC, asserting it was pre-
empted by the FPA and impermissibly interfered with FERC’s authority over 
wholesale rates.182  Plaintiffs argued that the ZEC provided compensation to a 
particular resource type, which in turn improved that resource owner’s over-
all profit margin.183  Doing so, the plaintiffs maintained, encroached on FERC’s 
jurisdiction to craft compensation as derived from federally regulated power 
markets by providing those resource owners a different and additional stream 
of compensation.184
178. Id. at 768.
179. Id. at 776.
180. Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3855/1–75 (2016); NY Clean 
Energy Standard Order, supra note 94.
181. Michael Panfil, Supreme Court Declines to Hear New York and Illinois Clean 
Energy Cases Challenging Zero Emission Credit, Legal Planet (May 30, 2019), https://
legal-planet.org/2019/05/30/guest-blogger-michael-panfil-supreme-court-declines-to-hear-
new-york-and-illinois-clean-energy-cases-challenging-zero-emission-credits [https://perma.
cc/MEL6-49WY]; see also NY Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 94, at 1, 119.
182. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018); Elec. Power 
Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2018).
183. See Coal. for Competitive Elec., 906 F.3d at 48; EPSA v. Star, 904 F.3d at 522.
184. See Coal. for Competitive Elec., 906 F.3d at 48; EPSA v. Star, 904 F.3d at 522. 
Although the courts upheld both the New York and Illinois ZECs, state policymaking 
authority is not unfettered.  In an earlier case, Hughes v. Talen, the Supreme Court held that 
a Maryland ‘contract for differences’ was preempted by the FPA. Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).  This case, like others described in this Part, relied upon 
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District and appellate courts uniformly disagreed.185  The Second and 
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals (and federal district courts before them) 
concluded that the ZEC policies were not preempted and were instead valid 
exercises of state policymaking authority in furtherance of their citizen’s wel-
fare and wellbeing.  In reaching this conclusion, the circuit courts framed their 
analysis through collaborative federalism.  Both decisions echo now familiar 
language.  The Second Circuit held that “[c]ourts must avoid mistaking the 
‘congressionally designed interplay between state and federal regulation for 
impermissible tension that requires pre‐emption.’”186  Likewise, although rec-
ognizing “the exercise of powers reserved to the states under [the FPA] affects 
interstate sales,” the Seventh Circuit held “[t]hose effects do not lead to pre-
emption; they are instead an inevitable consequence of a system in which 
power is shared between state and national governments.”187
The appellate decisions reflect an understanding that policy prefer-
ences have evolved, with states leading efforts to address the ills of climate 
change.  This policy preference remains grounded, in a longstanding state goal 
and exercise of authority: to protect citizen’s welfare and wellbeing.  State 
policymaking to this end, will generally be upheld if the basis for litigation is 
solely that the state policy will impact FERC-jurisdictional wholesale markets. 
Under a collaborative federalism framework courts eschew jurisdiction drawn 
on a bright-line, and therefore such an impact is insufficient for preemption. 
Instead, impacts between wholesale and retail actions are expected, and col-
laborative federalism frames the relevant inquiry in determining state public 
policy interplay with federal jurisdiction as one of whether a state mandates 
a collaborative federalism framework.  The Court’s analysis first noted the change ongoing 
in the energy sector, and that “FERC’s role has evolved.”  Id. at 1292.  FERC’s role, in turn, 
cannot be undone by state actors: “Once FERC sets . . . a rate . . . a State may not conclude 
in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are unreasonable.”  Id. at 
1298 (quoting Miss. Power & Light v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 373 (1988)).  This holding left 
significant room for states to act, with the Court cabining its holding by concluding that “[n]
othing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encour-
aging production of new or clean generation ‘through measures untethered to a generator’s 
wholesale market participation.’” Id. at 1299 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 40).  Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes reinforces the collaborative federalism framework 
foundation for the judgment: “In short, the Federal Power Act, like all collaborative federal-
ism statutes, envisions a federal-state relationship marked by interdependence.”  Id. at 1300 
(Sotomoyor, J., concurring).  The narrow holding in Hughes was thus consistent with and 
considered through a collaborative federalism framework, which allows for both federal and 
state authority over a resource.  Indeed, the program at issue in Hughes is precisely an exam-
ple of the relationship gone awry, where a state action in essence “disregards” and nullifies 
the federal government’s action.
185. Plaintiffs additionally sought cert., which the Supreme Court denied. Elec. Power 
Supply Ass’n v. Rhodes, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
186. Coal. for Competitive Elec., 906 F.3d at 50 (quoting Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1300) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).
187. EPSA v. Star, 904 F.3d at 524.
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wholesale participation and guarantees a generator a wholesale rate different 
from a consequently displaced FERC wholesale price.
Conclusion
The cumulative effect of restructuring, and the development of ISOs; 
technological innovation; and changing state policy preferences is transform-
ing the power sector.  The evolution bears similarity to the movement of the 
industry around Attleboro and the growth of the grid as it extended beyond 
state lines.  In both instances, modernizing forces created strain upon exist-
ing legal and regulatory structures designed with a different set of facts and 
characteristics in mind.  Both instances led to legal and regulatory reform and 
swift court adoption of a jurisdictional framework well-suited to adjudicate 
sector disputes.  The current regulatory overlap does not, however, require new 
foundational legal authority, like the Attleboro gap did.  Instead, it requires 
new application of already existing law.  Congress, FERC, and states have 
responded to foundational change with action based upon existing core stat-
utory authorities, applying them in new ways to new technologies.  Their legal 
and regulatory responses have caused new jurisdictional tensions to arise, 
which increased litigation around the FPA’s espoused division of authority.
The judiciary has responded to rising jurisdictional tension as it did before, 
doing so at present by adopting a functionalist interpretation of the FPA that 
employs a role-specific inquiry in recognition of the changing electricity sector. 
Recent case law adopting a collaborative federalism framework as the Court’s 
favored approach to adjudicating jurisdictional tension between the states and 
FERC has clarified the contours of the relevant analysis, but pressing concerns 
remain unresolved.  In coming years, consistent application of a collaborative 
federalism framework will be critical as the energy sector continues to change 
and evolve.  Many nascent actions already exist that are emblematic of the call 
and response of foundational change and legal and regulatory reaction, and 
will provide a basis for the courts to employ a collaborative federalism frame-
work to resolving current jurisdictional conflict.
First, a coalition of industry and state regulatory associations recently 
challenged FERC Order No. 841, which provides energy storage resources 
access to wholesale power markets.  The petitioners argue that FERC’s failure 
to provide states the ability to keep their energy storage resources out of the 
wholesale market and “opt-out” of the order violates the FPA’s jurisdictional 
division of authority.188  The way in which collaborative federalism is applied 
will require the judiciary to build upon its previous opinions to determine 
whether FERC’s order explicitly aims at something other than that within 
its jurisdiction and whether it directly usurps state authority over the distri-
bution system.
188. Consolidated Petition for Review, No. 19–1142 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 2019).
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Similarly, courts will likely be asked to consider recent FERC orders 
in response to ISO-NE and PJM proposed capacity market changes.  FERC 
approved an ISO-NE capacity market proposal that relegated state-supported 
renewable resources to a secondary market189 and found PJM’s entire capacity 
market structure to be unjust and unreasonable on the basis that it did not ade-
quately mitigate state-supported resources.190  FERC’s Orders explicitly target 
state laws implementing state clean energy priorities.191  Any court review of 
FERC’s Orders would center upon the validity of federal action taken with the 
explicit aim of counteracting state policies and usurping states’ ability to influ-
ence generation mix under a collaborative federalism framework.192
These examples are among expected near-term actions that will require 
the judiciary to build upon current enunciations of collaborative federalism. 
The courts will apply the framework against the backdrop of a grid that is rap-
idly transitioning, a recently restructured sector, and state preferences that are 
evolving to prioritize climate action.  As it has before, foundational change 
in the energy sector will provide the basis for the judiciary’s adjudication of 
the interwoven authority of federal and state governments, and collaborative 
federalism will provide it with the framework to resolve the consequent juris-
dictional overlap in the way most consistent with the characteristics of the 
modern electricity sector.
189. ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018).
190. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018).
191. Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, at *12 (2019) 
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
192. The first petition for review was filed on December 23, 2019 by the Illinois 
Commerce Commission.  See Petition for Review, Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (7th Cir. 
Dec. 23, 2019).
